Lloyd D. Coley v. Nancy P. Coley : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Lloyd D. Coley v. Nancy P. Coley : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lloyd D. Coley; Attorney Pro Se.
Randall J. Holmgren; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Lloyd D. Coley v. Nancy P. Coley, No. 900446 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2845
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTA'-' 
DOC T 
KFU 
50 
•A10 
DOCKET NO. „ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LLOYD D. COLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NANCY P. COLEY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 900446-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
JULY 13, 1990 AND AN AMENDED ORDER JANUARY 9, 1991 
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, AND AN ORDER 
AUGUST 7, 1990 OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Randall J. Holmgren 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Appellee 
Lloyd D. Coley 
1065 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Appellant Pro Se 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LLOYD D. COLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NANCY P. COLEY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 900446-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
JULY 13, 1990 AND AN AMENDED ORDER JANUARY 9, 1991 
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, AND AN ORDER 
AUGUST 7, 1990 OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Randall J. Holmgren 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Appellee 
Lloyd D. Coley 
1065 Lake Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Appellant Pro Se 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
B. Disposition in the Lower Court 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE SAWAYA DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FIRST, EIGHTH, OR FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AS ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF. 
2 . JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF ' S NON-PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS 
AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF 
THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD NOT TO HAVE VISITATION 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDITIONING 
THE RESTORATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON 
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDERS. 
1. 
II < .A b?H-l<>-U) DOES NOT PREVENT THE DISTRICT 
COURT FROM RESTRICTING A PARENT'S VISITATION 
PRIVILEGES IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
RESTRICTION IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OK Tllh 
CHILD. 
AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING IS PROPER FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF SUSPENDING AND/OR TERMINATING 
PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION. 
6. THE DISTRICT COURT CAN SIGN AN ORDER EVEN 
THOUGH OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IF THE 
DISTRICT COURT FINS THE OBJECTIONS HAVE NO 
MERIT. 
7. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION THAT 
JUDGE SAWAYA IS BIASED. 
24 
26 
27 
28 
8. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
28 
ADDENDUM 31 
XX. 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Paqe(s) 
Burt vs. Burt. 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 
(Utah App. 1990) 29 
Dana vs. Dana. 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76 
(Utah App. 1990) 14,15 
Hurt VS. Hurt. 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah App. 1990) 29 
In Re J. P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) 10 
Interest of Walter B.. 577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1978) 10 
Lunsford vs. Waldrip. 493 P.2d 382, 383 
(Wash. App. 1972) 14 
Meyer vs. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 
625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) 10 
Reardon vs. Reardon. 415 P.2d 571, 574 
(Ariz. App. 1966) 
Rohr vs. Rohr. 709 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1985) 
Slade vs. Slade. 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1978) 
Smith vs. Smith, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 
(Utah App. 1990) 
Soderburq vs. Soderburq. 299 P.2d 479 (Idaho 1956) 
West vs. West. 487 P.2d 96 (Or. App. 1971) 
14 ! 
) 
,17 
16 
, 1 8 
, 2 4 ( 
, 2 0 , 
14 
14 
14 , 
r 25 
, 2 1 
14 
, 1 5 
, 1 5 
, 1 5 
iii. 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann., §77-35-26 (repealed 1989) 1 
Utah Code Ann., §78-3a-2(14) (1989) 10 
Utah Code Ann., §78-27-56 (1988) 29 
Utah Code Ann., §78-32-10 (1990) 24 
COURT RULES CITED 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(2) (1991) 27 
iv. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LLOYD D. COLEY, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NANCY P. COLEY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 900446-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Jurisdiction Section of "Brief of Appellant" (p. 4) is 
defective for the following reasons: 
1. Utah Code Annotated §77-35-26 (2)(a) and (b) is part of 
the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure; this is a civil matter. 
2. Utah Code Annotated §77-35-26 was repealed in 1989. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order, on an Order to Show Cause 
dated, July 13, 1990 (Record at 268-271). Plaintiff filed a Notice 
of Appeal (Record at 316). On October 10, 1990 the Court of 
Appeals vacated and remanded the Order to the district court for 
further findings of fact with respect to the restriction of 
Plaintiff's visitation with the parties7 minor daughter. (Record 
at 332-333). The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction to review 
any amended order of the district court. An Amended Order was 
entered on January 9, 1991. 
Plaintiff is also appealing (See "Supplemental Brief of 
Appellant") a final Order, August 7, 1990, of Judge Michael Murphy1 
denying Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice. (Record at 
314-315). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Defendant instituted this action by 
filing a "Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause" against 
Plaintiff on or about February 21, 1990 (Record at 213). In the 
"Verified Motion" Defendant alleged: 
a) That numerous judgments had been entered against 
Plaintiff for failure to pay child support.2 (Record at 
213). 
Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District Court. 
2
 At the time of the "Verified Motion", the Plaintiff had not 
made any payment of child support since November or December, 1988 
and was over $27,000.00 in arrears. 
2 
b) That Plaintiff had been held in contempt of court 
and had served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail for 
his contempt.3 (Record at 214). 
c) That Plaintiff still demanded his visitation rights 
with the parties' minor daughter after his release from 
jail. (Record at 214). 
d) That the trial court should again sentence Plaintiff 
to serve time in the Salt Lake County Jail for his 
continued failure to pay child support and his continued 
contempt of court. (Record at 214). 
e) That the trial court should suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation rights with the parties' minor daughter for 
his continued contempt of court. (Record at 214). 
Disposition in the Lower Court. A hearing was held on 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause on June 18, 1990 in the Third 
District Court. Evidence was proffered by counsel for Defendant 
and Plaintiff was called to testify. Judge James S. Sawaya found 
that Plaintiff was in contempt and ordered Plaintiff's visitation 
terminated until further order of the court and sentenced Plaintiff 
to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail# however, 
the jail sentence was suspended. (Record at 262). An Order was 
On or about November, 1989. 
3 
signed by Judge Sawaya on July 13, 1990, (Record 268-271), and an 
Amended Order was entered by Judge Sawaya on January 9, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff's "Statement of Case" (p. 6 of Brief of 
Appellant), consists of approximately 34 paragraphs that, 
collectively, are somewhat true but are generally misleading and 
slanted according to Plaintiff's pro-se and non-lawyer approach to 
his own case. Rather than challenge the truth and veracity of 
Plaintiff's representations of fact, Defendant elects to set forth 
her own version of the pertinent facts as follows. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on September 8, 
1982 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. (Decree, Record at 12-14). Plaintiff was ordered to pay 
child support in the amount of $250.00 per month for the parties' 
minor child until said child reached age 21. (Record at 13). 
3. Since the entry of the Decree, Defendant has brought 
numerous motions for orders to show cause against Plaintiff for 
child support arrearages, payment of medical expenses, for the 
timely payment of child support, etc..4 
4
 November 17, 1982, judgment entered in the amount of 
$1,750.00. (Record at 24-25). 
February 7, 1984, judgment entered in the amount of 
$1,880.14. (Record at 53-55, 65-67) 
4 
4. On December 3, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was held 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court, on the 
issue of Plaintiff's contempt of court for failing to pay court 
ordered child support. 
5. On December 16, 1988, an Order was entered finding 
Plaintiff in contempt of court and sentencing Plaintiff to thirty 
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail. Imposition of the sentence 
was reserved for sixty (60) days to give Plaintiff time to purge 
himself of the contempt. (Record at 188-193). 
6. On January 24, 1989, Plaintiff, having failed to purge 
the contempt, was ordered (in court) to surrender himself to the 
Salt Lake County Jail on January 27, 1989 for a period of thirty 
(30) days. (Record at 212). 
7. On January 27, 1989, Plaintiff failed to report at the 
jail as ordered. 
April 22, 1986, judgment entered in the amount of 
$5,471.00, combining all previous judgments. (Record at 95-99) 
October 27, 1988, judgment entered in the amount of 
$10,001.24. (Record at 173-177) 
July 13, 1990, judgment entered in the amount of 
$27,365.76 combining all previous judgments plus interest. (Record 
at 268-271) 
5 
8. On February 6, 1989 a bench warrant was issued against 
Plaintiff after he failed to appear on January 27, 1989 as ordered. 
(Record at 211). 
9. Plaintiff left the State of Utah for several months 
(Hearing Transcript, June 18, 1990, pg. 10-12, 15-21) and upon his 
return to Utah he was arrested and served his jail sentence during 
November, 1989. 
10. On February 21, 1990, Defendant filed a Verified Motion 
for Order to Show Cause, (Record at 213-215), requesting judgment 
for child support arrearages, for Plaintiff to be sentenced to jail 
for continued contempt and for Plaintiff's visitation with the 
parties' minor child to be suspended. On May 7, 1990, Defendant 
filed an Affidavit in Support of said Motion. (Record at 222-233). 
11. On June 18, 1990, Defendant's Order to Show Cause was 
heard by Judge Sawaya. Plaintiff testifietd and Defendant's 
testimony was proffered by counsel. Based upon the evidence 
presented, Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in continuing contempt of 
court and ordered Plaintiff to serve thirty (30) days in jail and 
suspended Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child. 
(Record at 262). 
6 
12. On July 13, 1990, an Order was entered against Plaintiff 
for child support arrearages5, for continued contempt of court, and 
suspending Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child. 
(Record at 268-271). 
13. On July 16, 1990, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Bias 
or Prejudice (Record at 272-284) and on July 20, 1990 Plaintiff 
filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice (Record at 299-
304). 
14. On August 1, 1990, Judge Sawaya entered a Minute Entry 
stating "the Court having reviewed the Affidavit of * Bias or 
Prejudice in the above entitled matter and questions its 
sufficiency and orders the same referred to Judge Murphy for his 
determination." (Record at 313). 
15. On August 1, 1990, Judge Michael R. Murphy entered an 
Order stating Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice lacked 
legal sufficiency and that Judge Sawaya would remain assigned to 
the case. (Record at 314-315). 
16. On August 13, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of 
the July 13, 1990 Order of Judge Sawaya and the August 7, 1990 
Order of Judge Murphy. (Record at 316). 
17. On October 10, 1990, this Court vacated the July 13, 1990 
Order denying Plaintiff contact with the parties' minor child and 
5
 Judgment was entered for $27,365.76. 
7 
temporarily remanded to the district court for additional findings 
on the issue of the best interest of the child. This Court 
retained jurisdiction to review any new orders. (Record at 332-
333). 
18. On December 11, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law were signed by Judge Sawaya pertaining to the July 13, 1990 
Order. 
19. On January 9, 1991 an Amended Order6 was entered by Judge 
Sawaya in accordance with the Findings and Conclusions of December 
11, 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Amended Order7 signed by Judge Sawaya does not violate the 
First, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution as argued by Plaintiff. 
Judge Sawaya found that Plaintiff's non-payment of child 
support was willful and contumacious and that it was in the best 
interest of the minor child not to have visitation with Plaintiff. 
The district court did not err in conditioning the restoration 
of visitation rights upon compliance with support orders. 
Amending the June 18, 1990 Order on Order to Show Cause. 
7
 January 9, 1991. 
8 
U.C.A. §78-32-10 does not prevent the district court from 
restricting visitation privileges, if the court finds that the 
restriction is in the best interests of the child. 
An order to show cause proceeding is proper for the purpose 
of suspending and/or terminating Plaintiff's visitation. 
The district court can sign an order even though objections 
have been filed if the district court finds the objections have no 
merit. 
Plaintiff fails to support his contention that Judge Sawaya 
is biased. 
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE SAWAYA DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE FIRST, EIGHTH, OR FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AS ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff states in his Brief (p. 13) that "there is a 
constitutional right of a parent to maintain a personal and close 
relationship with their [sic] children" and cites to several cases 
to support his position. (Interest of Walter B., 577 P. 2d 119 
(Utah 1978); Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 
626, L.Ed. 1042 (1923); and In Re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982). 
All of these cases involve the termination of parental rights. 
Plaintiff's reliance on these cases is flawed for two reasons: 
first, the cases are limited in scope to permanent termination of 
parental rights while case at hand is far more limited in that 
Judge Sawaya merely suspended Plaintiff's visitation until he 
exhibits behavior consistent with the best interests of his 
daughter; and, second, the cases are cited out-of-context of the 
law governing suspending of visitation rights because there are 
numerous cases that empower a court to restrict or suspend 
visitation rights under certain fact situations. 
Termination of parental rights means the permanent elimination 
of all parental rights and duties, by court order. (See, Utah Code 
Ann., §78-3a-2(14). In the present case, Judge Sawaya did not 
permanently eliminate the Plaintiff's parental rights or his 
10 
visitation. The Judge merely suspended the Plaintiff's visitation 
until he responsibly responds to the needs of his daughter. 
Plaintiff errs in trying to insert into this case legal authorities 
which pertain to permanent parental-right deprivation situations. 
This case is not about permanently terminating Plaintiff's 
parental rights; it is about a parent's responsibility to help his 
ex-wife raise their child. Plaintiff may think that because his 
ex-wife has a home and employment — and because his daughter gets 
fed, clothed and cared for without assistance from him — that this 
is just a case of legal semantics where he can play lawyer and 
appeal his case8 and spend countless hours trying to legally 
justify why he does not financially support his daughter. However, 
this is a case where, as Judge Sawaya found, Plaintiff's failure 
to pay child support is willful and contumacious. It does not take 
a legal scholar to rightly conclude that a man who willfully 
refuses to support his child does not have her best interest at 
heart or in mind. 
On February 8, 1989 Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition against Judge Sawaya in this Court. On July 28, 1989 
this Court determined that the Petition was frivolous and therefore 
denied the same. On August, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Appeal in the matter at hand. Since the filing of the Notice, 
Plaintiff has filed several motions and this matter was heard by 
this Court back in October, 1990. Plaintiff has continued with the 
matter since that time and has filed several more motions and has 
even filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme 
Court with respect to the Order of this Court denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Stay. 
11 
Plaintiff next argues that the Amended Order violates the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution as it 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. There are several cases 
in which visitation has been suspended or conditioned and Defendant 
will cite those cases below. Plaintiff's only support for his 
argument that suspension of visitation amounts to cruel and unusual 
punishment is his own subjective belief that it does. 
The credibility of Plaintiff's statement, that the Amended 
Order destroys a loving relationship, is undermined by the fact 
that Plaintiff, of his own accord, willfully refuses to financially 
support his child and he physically abandoned her between February, 
1989 until after November, 1989.9 
Plaintiff further contends that the Amended Order violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying 
him due process. Plaintiff has had more than ample opportunity to 
show Judge Sawaya, as supported by the entire record, that he 
genuinely loves and cares for his daughter in not only word but, 
as important, in deed. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Amended Order violates his 
First Amendment rights of free speech. The district court did not 
rule that Plaintiff could not possess the attitudes and beliefs he 
portrays, or that he could not express them in public places. The 
9
 See Defendant's Statement of Facts #7. 
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district court simply ruled that it was not in the best interest 
of the minor child to be exposed to Plaintiff's anti-social 
attitudes and beliefs through contact with him. The district court 
is not punishing Plaintiff for his beliefs but is only trying to 
impress upon Plaintiff his proper behavior and responsibility to 
his daughter. Specifically, Plaintiff has a parental 
responsibility to bring up his daughter to be the best citizen 
possible. 
Therefore, nothing in the Amended Order contradicts the 
Constitution of the United States and it does not in any manner 
violate Plaintiff's rights. 
2 . JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF ' S NON-PAYMENT 
OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS 
AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD NOT TO HAVE VISITATION 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Sawaya suspended his visitation 
for the sole reason that Plaintiff is willfully not paying his 
court-ordered child support. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Amended Order clearly takes into consideration the best 
13 
interest of the child as required under Rohr vs. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 
(Utah 1985 ).10 
The Lunsford, Slade, West, Soderburg, Smith, and Dana cases, 
cited by Plaintiff, are erroneously utilized by Plaintiff; the 
portions of those cases that he refers to are taken out of context. 
In Lunsf ord vs. Waldrip, 493 P. 2d 789 at 792 (Wash. App. 
1972), the Washington Court of Appeals stated: 
The paramount concern in such matters 
[suspending visitation] is the welfare of the 
child, and the conduct of the father as it 
affects the child's welfare is a proper 
consideration for the trial court. 
How can it be in the best interest of any child to be raised by a 
parent who refuses, unless faced with jail or suspension of 
visitation, to pay any support to help provide food, clothing, 
shelter, etc. for that child? In the present case, the district 
court found that Plaintiff was educated, healthy and able to 
provide the ordered support and that Plaintiff had not given the 
district court any reason whatsoever as to why Plaintiff had not 
paid the support as ordered. 
Slade vs. Slade, 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), was an action by 
a father to establish visitation rights with his child who was born 
... where the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay child 
support is contumacious, or willful and intentional, and not due 
to inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or denied, 
if the welfare of the child so requires. Rohr (p.383). 
14 
out of wedlock and the Utah Supreme Court found that "visitation 
is a matter addressed to the district court's sound discretion". 
(Slade at 901). 
In West vs. West, 487 P. 2d 96 (Or. App. 1971), the case 
involved an order by the trial court conditioning the father's 
visitation upon the father paying the court ordered child support. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "the right of visitation 
cannot be made dependent upon the payment of support for children 
....". However, the court upheld the trial court's order: 
[T]he order was set for the purpose of 
bringing home to the defendant a sense of 
responsibility for the child. (West at 98) 
Soderburg vs. Soderburg, 299 P.2d 479 (Idaho 1956), is a case 
where the father petitioned the trial court for a restraining order 
so that the children's mother could not transport the children out 
of the court's jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Smith vs. Smith, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
33 (Utah App. 1990) is inappropriate because the language quoted 
by Plaintiff refers to a situation where a party sought a change 
in custody because the other party had interfered with visitation 
rights. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Dana vs. Dana, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76 
(Utah App. 1990) is similarly mistaken because the visitation issue 
in that case focused on the mother's complaint that the father did 
15 
not exercise visitation and she wanted him to be ordered to comply 
with the visitation schedule or be ordered to pay additional child 
support to offset her babysitting expenses. 
In Reardon vs. Reardon
 r 415 P.2d 571 at 574 (Ariz. App. 1966) 
the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 
The denial of [sic] right of visitation 
conditioned upon payment of support monies is 
based on the premise that the primary 
beneficiaries of support payments are the 
children and that the court may balance the 
equities by requiring the husband to make the 
payments for the benefit of the children 
before visitation is allowed, against allowing 
the father to visit the children regardless of 
whether the father cares enough to provide 
adequate support for his children or not. 
We are not persuaded there was error in 
requiring the father to keep up his payments 
of $25 per month, as a condition to his seeing 
them and having temporary custody once a week. 
This is not to be construed as a bartering of 
justice, but rather a holding that to this 
extent the father must perform the duty to 
support his children, if he expects the 
pleasure of their companionship. The court 
holds out an inducement to perform <i father's 
duty. Since the court retains full control 
over this matter, so as to suit orders to 
conditions that may arise, .... 
In the case at hand, The Plaintiff has failed to provide 
support for his daughter for several years except when faced with 
jail. The only actions which have prompted payments by Plaintiff 
have been jail sentences, yet after serving the first jail 
sentence, Plaintiff still made no child support payments until 
16 
faced with a second jail sentence. In suspending Plaintiff's 
visitation for a period of time, Judge Sawaya is trying to help 
Plaintiff realize and understand that he (Plaintiff) has a 
responsibility to support his daughter. 
Therefore, the Amended Order did not suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation for the sole reason of non-payment of support. 
At this point, a review of Rohr is appropriate. The facts in 
Rohr and the facts in the present case are compared as follows: 
1. Amount of Father's Child-Support Arrearage. At the 
time the issue of suspending visitation came before the 
district court, the amount of the father's child-support 
delinquency was: 
a. In Rohr: $2,400. Id. at 383. 
b. In Coley: $27,305.00 (Amended Order). 
2. Number of Child-Support Judgments Against Father. 
At the time the issue of suspending visitation came 
before the district court, the court had entered 
judgments for child support against the father: 
a. In Rohr: Not apparent from case test. 
b. In Coley: 4 previous times. (Record at 223). 
3. Conditions on Restoration of Visitation. At the 
time the issue of suspending visitation came before the 
17 
district court, the district court conditioned 
restoration of visitation upon: 
a. In Rohr: Payment of all arrearages 
of alimony, child support, 
attorney7s fees and costs, at which 
time the court would determine what 
visitation would be appropriate. 
Id. at 383. 
b. In Coley: Payment of $450 per month 
for 4 consecutive months (i.e. 
ongoing support of $250 per month 
and payment of $200 per month toward 
the arrearage judgment of $27,305.00 
which was accruing interest of 
$273.05 per month at the rate of 12% 
per annum post-judgment interest.) 
The Utah Supreme Court then held that the following 
principles of law applied to the Rohr facts: 
1. "A court may not deny the noncustodial parent 
visitation rights for the mere failure to pay child 
support, where the failure to pay is due to an inability 
to pay." In the present case, Judge Sawaya found that 
Plaintiff had the ability to earn incomei (Findings of 
18 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order 
to Show Cause) and that Plaintiff's failure to pay was 
willful and contumacious (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order to Show 
Cause). 
2. "[W]here the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay 
child support is willful and intentional, and not due to 
inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or 
denied, if the welfare of the child so requires" and "the 
conduct of the father [sic] as it affects the child's 
welfare is a proper consideration of the trial court." 
In the present case, Judge Sawaya made the following 
findings with respect to the requirement "if the welfare 
of the child so requires" and as to "the conduct of the 
father as it affects the child's welfare": 
a. Plaintiff does not respect the legal 
system. (Findings of Fact #12). 
b. Plaintiff's attitudes and behaviors 
are anti-social and constitute a 
substantial deviation from the moral 
norms of society. (Findings of Fact 
#12). 
19 
c. Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes 
are not a proper example for his 
child. (Findings of Fact #12). 
d. Plaintiff lacks concern for the 
child's financial welfare. 
(Conclusions of Law). 
Plaintiff's visitation was suspended to impress upon 
Plaintiff a sense of responsibility for the welfare of his child, 
and the district court found that until Plciintiff felt such a 
responsibility it was not in the daughter's best interest to have 
visitation with Plaintiff. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDITIONING 
THE RESTORATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON 
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDERS. 
The Plaintiff seems to argue that Rohr prohibited Judge Sawaya 
from conditioning the restoration of visitation rights upon payment 
of child support. (Brief of Appellant, p. 21-22). 
The quotation that Plaintiff inserts from Rohr does not 
support his contention. The language Plaintiff quotes referred to 
the Rohr trial court requiring payment of all back alimony, child 
support, attorney's fees and costs before the trial court would 
consider a modification of the divorce decree. 
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In the present case, the Amended Order does not in any way 
restrict Plaintiff from petitioning the trial court for a 
modification of the divorce decree and it does not require payment 
of all back child support, interest and attorney fees prior to 
restoration of visitation. The Amended Order provides Plaintiff 
with a means of restoring his visitation. Rohr did not prohibit 
Judge Sawaya from requiring Plaintiff to pay his ongoing child 
support of $250 per month and $200 per month toward the judgment 
of $27,305.00. n The purpose of Judge Sawaya's ruling was to 
convert Plaintiff from a willful non-payer of support to a willful 
payer of support. The Judge's experience with Plaintiff — which 
is clear from the record — was that Plaintiff did not pay child 
support and his failure to pay was willful. When found in contempt 
of court in 1989 for not paying child support, Plaintiff still did 
not pay. The first time he paid support, following the 1989 
hearings, was on the eve of going to jail, and then he did not pay 
the amount required to not go to jail. After serving the jail 
sentence, Plaintiff still did not pay until he was again brought 
before Judge Sawaya in 1990 and faced with the prospect of going 
to jail and losing his visitation. At that time, Plaintiff was 
again found in contempt of court and sentenced to jail, but Judge 
Post-judgment interest at 12% per annum was accruing on 
that judgment in the amount of approximately $273.05 per month. 
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Sawaya gave Plaintiff two payment options: $150 a week to stay out 
of jail or $450 a month for four consecutive months to stay out of 
jail and to have his visitation restored. Plaintiff has elected 
the first option and has ignored the second option. With respect 
to the first option, Plaintiff has seldom paid on a weekly basis. 
Judge Sawaya's obvious intent was to help Plaintiff get used to 
paying a small amount of $50 per week on a regular basis. Rather 
than paying weekly, however, Plaintiff has paid a day or two in 
advance of regularly-scheduled contempt-review hearings. A day or 
two before each such hearing, Plaintiff will pay most of what was 
owed since the previous such hearing, but when he does so he is 
usually about $100 short of what should have been paid (assuming 
he had paid $50 per week).12 Nevertheless, the partial payment 
usually satisfies Judge Sawaya enough so that he continues to stay 
imposition of the contempt jail sentence. 
Review of the record will reveal that Judge Sawaya was 
basically faced with this dilemma: 
Defendant has brought her ex-husband to court a 
number of times and obtained judgments; 
Plaintiff is well-educated, lives reasonably well, 
has income, and eats well and his failure to pay child 
support is willful; 
The Defendants' judgments against Plaintiff have run 
up to $27,305.00; 
12
 See "Schedule of Payments" attached hereto. 
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Accrual of interest on the judgments doesn/t prompt 
payments by Plaintiff; 
Assessment of attorney fees against Plaintiff 
doesn't prompt payments; 
Imposition of a jail sentence prompted a few hundred 
dollars in payments but as soon as Plaintiff was out of 
jail he didn't make any more payments until faced with 
the prospect of a second jail sentence; 
If Plaintiff would work as hard at gainful 
employment as he works in trying to avoid judgments and 
contempt orders, he'd probably be able to support his 
daughter quite well; 
Plaintiff works awfully hard at trying to avoid 
paying support, and I don't think that type of behavior 
and attitude is a socially-responsible or healthy 
attitude for his daughter to be subjected to directly or 
indirectly; 
So what do I do to turn Plaintiff into a child-
support paying parent? 
Given the foregoing, Judge Sawaya exercised proper judicial 
discretion in fashioning a contempt order designed to impress upon 
Plaintiff his responsibility to financially support his daughter, 
and an order that would allow him to get on with his visitation 
schedule in a matter of four short months. 
Finally, this appellate court stated in its October 10, 1990 
decision, that there needed to be some type of program by which 
Plaintiff's visitation rights could be restored unto him. 
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4. U.C.A §78-32-10 DOES NOT PREVENT THE DISTRICT 
COURT FROM RESTRICTING A PARENT'S VISITATION 
PRIVILEGES IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
RESTRICTION IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in using its 
contempt power to suspend Plaintiff's visitation rights. 
Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay 
the court ordered child support and sentenced Plaintiff to thirty 
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail. That sentence was 
suspended with the condition that Plaintiff make $50.00 per week 
installment payments. 
Plaintiff's visitation rights were also suspended because the 
trial court found it was not in the best interest of the child to 
have visitation with her father at this time. Plaintiff's 
visitation was also suspended based on the trial court believing, 
based on the history of the case, that it would take more than a 
jail sentence to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of responsibility 
for the welfare of his child. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Reardon at 574 stated: 
Support payments, however, are provided for 
the benefit of the minor children and when 
considering the history of the matter, the age 
of the children, the past conduct of the non-
custodial parent in exercising rights of 
visitation, and the possible ineffectiveness 
of the court contempt power, the trial court 
could properly find that the children will 
benefit by conditioning visitation privileges 
upon payment of support (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty (30) 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail in early 1989 and served that 
sentence in approximately November of 1989. Between that time 
(November, 1989) and the filing of Defendant's Order to Show Cause 
in April 1990, Plaintiff made no efforts to pay ongoing child 
support nor did he make any attempt to reduce the arrearages. 
Judge Sawaya knowing this, not only found Plaintiff in contempt 
again but, based on the history of the case and the nominal effect 
the last jail term had on Plaintiff, also decided that further 
measures were needed to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of 
responsibility for his daughter's welfare. 
The Arizona Court in Reardon further stated: 
Nothing we say herein should be construed by 
parties litigant that they may assume the 
burden upon themselves of denying rights of 
visitation conditioned on payment of support 
monies without a court order. This is a power 
that the court only may have and it is basic 
that the parties themselves do not have the 
authority to so modify the orders of the 
court. (Xd at 574). 
Trial courts have the authority to suspend visitation. In the case 
at hand, Judge Sawaya did not abuse any of the powers which have 
been vested in him by the State of Utah. Judge Sawaya was simply 
fashioning an order to try and bring home to Plaintiff a sense of 
responsibility for the welfare of his daughter — knowing that if 
he can convince Plaintiff that Plaintiff has that responsibility, 
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and that if Plaintiff will perform that responsibility, the overall 
long-term relationship between that father and child will be 
enhanced and strengthened. 
5. AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING IS PROPER FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF SUSPENDING AND/OR TERMINATING 
PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in "denying 
visitation" in the absence of a petition for modification. The 
trial court's power includes the power to suspend and/or terminate 
Plaintiff's visitation rights without modifying the divorce decree. 
The trial court can impose restrictions upon existing rights if the 
trial court determines that such is necessctry to compel a party's 
performance of an obligation. Plaintiff's reliance on Rohr is 
misplaced because, in that case, the wife petitioned to modify the 
decree permanently. In the present case, Defendant's Order to Show 
Cause was not intended to permanently deprive Plaintiff of 
visitation. The intention of the Order to Show Cause, and the 
resulting Amended Order, was to temporarily suspend Plaintiff's 
visitation in order to impress upon him his responsibility for his 
daughter's care, support and welfare, and the resulting Amended 
Order gave Plaintiff an avenue whereby he could quickly re-instate 
his decree-awarded visitation rights. 
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6. THE DISTRICT COURT CAN SIGN AN ORDER EVEN 
THOUGH OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IF THE 
DISTRICT COURT FINDS THE OBJECTIONS HAVE NO 
MERIT. 
Nothing in Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, which is cited in Plaintiff's Brief, indicates that 
even though objections to an order have been filed that the judge 
cannot go ahead and sign the order over the objections. The Rule 
only states that a party must file their objections within five (5) 
days after receiving the proposed order. Further, Plaintiff cites 
no evidence that Judge Sawaya failed to review Plaintiff's 
objections before signing the July 13, 1990 Order. Assuming that 
Plaintiff's objections were received by Judge Sawaya on July 11, 
1990, as Plaintiff says, Judge Sawaya had three days, before he 
signed the July 13, 1990 Order, to review Plaintiff's objections. 
Furthermore, the July 13, 1990 Order was vacated and remanded. 
At the November 26, 1990 hearing (regarding several motions filed 
by Plaintiff), Judge Sawaya again took into consideration 
Plaintiff's objections to the proposed Amended Order before the 
Judge decided to write his own Findings of Fact. (November 26, 
1990 Hearing Transcript pg. 14). 
Plaintiff has failed to support his position that the trial 
court erred by signing the Order over his objections. 
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7. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION THAT 
JUDGE SAWAYA IS BIASED. 
This section is in response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief 
which is an appeal of the Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy, August 
7, 1990, in which Judge Murphy found no legal sufficiency to remove 
Judge Sawaya from this case. 
Plaintiff states that Judge Sawaya is biased against him 
because the Judge overruled his objections, denied his order to 
show cause, etc.. Those types of actions by a judge do not 
establish a condition of bias. The judge's function is to take 
evidence, weigh evidence, assess credibility, make findings of fact 
and apply existing law to the facts of the case. Someone will win 
and someone will lose, however that does not mean that the judge 
was biased against the loser. 
There is nothing in the record to support the Plaintiff's 
allegations of bias. 
8. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
Defendant does not believe that this appeal has been initiated 
in good faith for the reason that Plaintiff has not presented a 
plausible position. Defendant can only conclude that Plaintiff's 
motive has been to "wear down" Defendant's resolve and continue to 
avoid having to pay child support. If Plaintiff truly wanted to 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed in his Brief to provide any authority to 
support his legal arguments. Therefore, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Order to Judge Sawaya should be 
upheld, and Defendant should be awarded her attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this appeal. 
Date: May 23, 1991. 
Randall J. Holmgren 
continue his relationship with his daughter, he would use the time 
and energy involved in this appeal and put it towards making an 
effort to support his child and help provide for her. 
Based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988), Plaintiff should 
be required to pay the attorney's fees and costs incurred by 
Defendant in this appeal. (See Burt vs. Burt, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29, 30 (Utah App. 1990); Hurt vs. Hurt, 793 P. 2d 948, 951 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
DATED this <-J<J
 d a y o f M a y / 1 9 9 1 # 
C 
Randall J. Holmgren 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Section 
78-3a-52. Violation of order of court — Contempt 
— Penalty. 
78-3a-52.5. Minor held in detention — Credit for 
good behavior. 
78-3a-53. Courtrooms, office space and equipment 
— Maintenance costs of juvenile court. 
78-3a-54. Fines — Paid to state treasurer and re-
habilitative employment program — 
Witness costs and certification — 
Court costs — Juvenile court fees. 
78-3a-55. Court records — Inspection — When fin-
gerprints or photographs may be 
taken — Expungement. 
78-3a-56. Expungement of juvenile court record — 
Petition — Procedure. 
78-3a-57. Repealed. 
78-3a-58. Cooperation of political subdivisions and 
public or private agencies and organi-
zations. 
78-3a-59. Plan for obtaining health, mental health 
and related services for juveniles — 
Duty of administrator. 
78-3a-60, 78-3a-61. Repealed. 
78-3a-62. Short title. 
78-3a-63. Abused or neglected child — Guardian 
ad litem — Costs. 
78-3a-64. Abuse, neglect, or dependency of child — 
Coordination of proceedings. 
78-3a-65. Treatment for offender and victim — 
Costs. 
78-3a-l. Juveni le court — Purposes — Jurisdic-
tion. 
The juvenile court is established as a forum for the 
resolution of all matters properly brought before it, 
consistent with applicable constitutional and statu-
tory requirements of due process. The court has the 
jurisdiction, powers, and duties under this chapter to: 
(1) promote public safety and individual ac-
countability by the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions on persons who have committed acts in 
violation of law; 
(2) where appropriate, .order rehabilitation, 
reeducation, and t reatment for persons who have 
committed acts bringing them within the court's 
jurisdiction; 
(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, 
neglected, and dependent children and to provide 
care and protection for these children by place-
ment, protection, and custody orders; 
(4) adjudicate matters that relate to children 
who are beyond parental or adult control and to 
establish appropriate authority over these chil-
dren by means of placement and control orders; 
(5) order appropriate measures to promote 
guidance and control, preferably in the child's 
own home, as an aid in the prevention of future 
unlawful conduct and the development of respon-
sible citizenship; 
(6) remove a child from parental custody only 
where the minor's safety or welfare, or the public 
safety, may not otherwise be adequately safe-
guarded; and 
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to 
act in the best interests of the children in all 
cases and at tempt to preserve and strengthen 
family ties where possible. 1988 
78-3a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abused child" includes a child less than 18 
years of age who has suffered or been threatened 
with nonaccidental physical or mental harm, 
negligent treatment, sexual exploitation, or been 
the victim of a sexual offense as defined in the 
Utah Criminal Code. 
(2) "Adjudication" means a finding by the 
court, incorporated in a decree, that the facts al-
leged in the petition have been proved. 
(3) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or 
over, except that persons 18 years or over under 
the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
pursuant to Section 78-3a-40 shall be referred to 
as children. 
(4) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court 
Judges. 
(5) "Child" means a person less than 18 years 
of age. 
(6) "Child placement agency" means: 
(a) a private agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under 
this code; or 
(b) a private agency receiving children for 
placement or adoption in another state, 
which agency is licensed or approved where 
such license or approval is required by law. 
(7) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody. 
(8) "Court" means the juvenile court or the dis-
trict juvenile court, as the case may be. 
(9) "Dependent child" includes a child who is 
homeless or without proper care through no fault 
of his parent, guardian, or custodian. 
(10) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer 
of legal custody by the court from a parent or the 
parents or a previous legal custodian to another 
person, agency, or institution. 
(11) "Detention" means the temporary care of 
children who require secure custody in physically 
restricting facilities: 
(a) pending court disposition or transfer to 
another jurisdiction; or 
(b) while under the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the court. 
(12) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means 
psychological and social counseling of one or 
more persons in the group, depending upon the 
recommendation of the therapist. 
(13) "Guardianship of the person" includes, 
among other things, the authority to consent to 
marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and 
to consent to major medical, surgical, or psychiat-
ric treatment. "Guardianship of the person" in-
cludes legal custody, if legal custody is not vested 
in another person, agency, or institution. 
(14) "Legal custody" means a relationship em-
bodying the following rights and duties: 
(a) the right to physical custody of a child; 
(b) the right and duty to protect, train, 
and discipline him; 
(c) the duty to provide him with food, 
clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary 
medical care; 
(d) the right to determine where and with 
whom he shall live; and 
(e) the right, in an emergency, to autho-
rize surgery or other extraordinary care. 
(15) "Neglected child" includes a child: 
(a) whose parent, guardian, or custodian 
has abandoned him or has subjected him to 
mistreatment or abuse; 
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(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or 
property damage or loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski 
area for the purpose of engaging in the sport of 
skiing. 
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a 
ski area operator to be used for skiing. 
(5) "Ski a rea operator" means those persons, 
and their agents , officers, employees or represen-
tat ives, who operate a ski area . 1979 
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing —- Bar against 
claim or recovery from operator for in-
jury from risks inherent in sport. 
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make 
any claim against, or recover from, any ski area oper-
ator for injury resulting from any of the inherent 
risks of skiing. 1986 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail 
boards listing inherent risks and limi-
tations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or 
more prominent locations within each ski area which 
shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and 
the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as 
defined in this act. 1979 
78-27-55. R e p e a l e d . 1980 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action 
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reason-
able attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), 
but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court en te r s in the record the reason for 
not award ing fees under the provisions of Subsec-
tion (1). 1988 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights 
to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to ei-
ther party that prevails in a civil action based upon 
any promissory note, written contract, or other writ-
ing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provi-
sions of the promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing allow at least one party to recover at-
torney's fees. 1986 
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state 
funded agency in action against state 
or subdivision — Forfeit of appropri-
ated monies. 
Any agency or organization receiving state funds 
which, as a result of its suing the state, or political 
subdivision thereof, receives attorney's fees and costs 
as all or part of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to 
the General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an 
amount equal to the attorney's fees received. 1981 
78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons 
other than law enforcement officers. 
Persons who are not peace officers, constables, 
sheriffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such offi-
cers or authorized state investigators in counties of 
400,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any 
forms of civil or criminal process other than com-
plaints, summonses, and subpoenas. 1983 
78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters. 
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" 
means any person which provides shelter, food, cloth-
ing, or other products or services without consider-
ation to indigent persons. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all tran-
sient shelters, owners, operators, and employees of 
transient shelters, and persons who contribute prod-
ucts or services to transient shelters, are immune 
from suit for damages or injuries arising out of or 
related to the damaged or injured person's use of the 
products or services provided by the transient shelter. 
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against 
a person for damages or injury intentionally caused 
by that person or resulting from his gross negligence. 
1986 
CHAPTER 27a 
SMALL BUSINESS EQUAL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE ACT 
Section 
78-27a-
78-27a-2 
78-27a-
78-27a-
-1. Short title. 
- . Legislative findings — Purpose. 
3. Definitions. 
4. Litigation expense award authorized in 
actions by state. 
78-27a-5. Litigation expense award authorized in 
appeals from administrative decisions. 
78-27a-6. Payment of expenses awarded — State-
ment required in agency's budget. 
78-27a-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act." 1983 
78-27a-2. Legislative findings — Purpose. 
The Legislature finds that small businesses may be 
deterred from seeking review of or defending against 
substantially unjustified governmental action be-
cause of the expense involved in securing the vindica-
tion of their rights. The purpose of this act is to enti-
tle small businesses, under conditions set forth in this 
act, to recover reasonable litigation expenses. 1983 
78-27a-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final 
judgment, the right to all appeals having been 
exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all 
counts or charges in the action and with respect 
to the most significant issue or set of issues pre-
sented, but does not include the settlement of any 
action, either by stipulation, consent decree or 
otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs be-
fore or after any hearing or trial. 
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means 
court costs, administrative hearing costs, attor-
ney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary wit-
nesses, not in excess of $10,000, which a court 
finds were reasonably incurred in opposing ac-
tion covered under this act. 
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or 
business entity, including a sole proprietorship, 
which does not have more than 250 employees, 
but does not include an entity which is a subsid-
iary or affiliate of another entity which is not a 
small business. 
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elected to perform a judicial or ministerial ser-
vice. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceed-
ings of the court, by a party to an action or spe-
cial proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order 
or process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or 
counselor of a court, and acting as such without 
authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the cus-
tody of an officer by virtue of an order or process 
of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to 
an action while going to, remaining at, or return-
ing from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the 
process or proceedings of a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, 
or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, ne-
glecting to attend or serve as such, or improperly 
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at 
such court, or with any other person, concerning 
the merits of such action, or receiving a commu-
nication from a party or other person in respect 
to it, without immediately disclosing the same to 
the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, or-
der or process of a superior court, or proceeding 
in an action or special proceeding contrary to 
law, after such action or special proceeding is re-
moved from the jurisdiction of such inferior tri-
bunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the 
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also 
a contempt of the authority of such officer. 1953 
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real prop-
erty. 
Every person dispossessed of, or ejected from or out 
of, any real property by the judgment or process of 
any court of competent jurisdiction, who, not having a 
right so to do, re-enters into or upon, or takes posses-
sion of, any such real property, or induces or procures 
any person, not having the right so to do, or aids or 
abets him therein, is guilty of a contempt of the court 
by which such judgment was rendered, or from which 
such process issued. Upon a conviction for such con-
tempt the court must immediately issue an alias pro-
cess, directed to the proper officer, requiring him to 
restore such possession to the party entitled thereto 
under the original judgment or process. 1953 
78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; sum-
mary action — Without immediate 
presence; procedure. 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate 
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, 
it may be punished summarily, for which an order 
must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such 
immediate view and presence, adjudging that the per-
son proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, 
and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 
78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed 
in the immediate view and presence of the court or 
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to 
the court or judge of the facts constituting the con-
tempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or 
arbitrators or other judicial officers. 1953 
78-32-4. Warrant of attachment or commitment 
order to show cause . 
When the contempt is not committed in the imme-
diate view and presence of the court or judge a war-
rant of attachment may be issued to bring the person 
charged to answer, or, without a previous arrest, a 
warrant of commitment may, upon notice, or upon an 
order to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of 
commitment can be issued without such previous at-
tachment to answer, or such notice or order to show 
cause. lass 
78-32-5. Bail. 
Whenever a warrant of attachment is issued pursu-
ant to this chapter, the court or judge must direct, by 
an endorsement on such warrant, that the person 
charged may be [let] to bail for his appearance, in an 
amount prescribed in such endorsement. 1953 
78-32-6. Duty of sheriff. 
Upon executing the warrant of attachment the 
sheriff must keep the person in custody, bring him 
before the court or judge and detain him until an 
order is made in the premises, unless the person ar-
rested entitles himself to be discharged as provided in 
the next section [Section 78-32-7]. 1953 
78-32-7. Bail bond — Form. 
When a direction to let the person arrested to bail 
is contained in the warrant of attachment or endorsed 
thereon, he must be discharged from the arrest upon 
executing and delivering to the officer, at any time 
before the return day of the warrant, a written under-
taking, with two sufficient sureties, to the effect that 
the person arrested will appear on the return of the 
warrant, and abide the order of the court or judge 
thereon, or that the sureties will pay as may be di-
rected the sum specified in the warrant. 1953 
78-32-8. Officer's return. 
The officer must return the warrant of arrest, and 
the undertaking, if any, received from the person ar-
rested, by the return day specified therein. 1953 
78-32-9. Hearing. 
When the person arrested.has been brought up or 
has appeared the court or judge must proceed to in-
vestigate the charge, and must hear any answer 
which the person arrested may make to the same, and 
may examine witnesses for or against him; for which 
an adjournment may be had from time to time, if 
necessary. 1953 
78-32-10. Contempt — Act ion by c o u r t 
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court 
shall determine whether the person proceeded 
against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court 
finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court 
may impose a fine not exceeding $200, order the per-
son imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding 30 
days, or order both fine and imprisonment. However, 
a justice court judge or court commissioner may pun-
ish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $100 or by 
imprisonment for one day, or by both the fine and 
imprisonment. 1990 
78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved. 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or 
special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights therein, is 
caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the 
fine or imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in 
place thereof, may order the person proceeded against 
to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient 
to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and ex-
Rule 4-503 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting and requesting jury in-
structions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented to the court five days 
prior to the scheduled trial date unless otherwise ordered by the court. The 
court, in its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any 
time prior to the submission of the case to the jury. At the time of presentation 
to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be furnished to oppos-
ing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing and state in full the in-
struction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red lines and firm names and 
shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written in lead pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least 
one copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets at-
tached to the particular instruction to which the citation applies. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- for "10" in the first sentence and added the 
ment added Justice Courts to the scope of ap- second sentence in Subdivision (1). 
plicability of this rule and substituted "five" 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
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the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- The 1990 amendment added the final sen-
ment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "ex- tence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not 
cept small claims" under "Applicability" and of record" following "courts of record" in the 
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivi-
of the Rule. sion (10). 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support 
of attorneys, fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts. 
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
COLEY, 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
i Judge James S. Sawaya 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Re: Amended Order on Order to Show Cause) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was 
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. 
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record, 
Randall J. Holmgren. 
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John 
R. Bucher. 
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in 
• Wife.*- V* * 
<* » * - * „ . . 
DEC 11 
/"Nj S-L"lf'..Mrt; 
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the 
Plaintifffs Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its 
Order on or about July 13, 1990. On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in considering Plaintifffs Motion to Stay certain aspects 
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the 
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to 
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings 
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation. 
Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court 
does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That these findings are based upon the evidence presented 
at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990. The Court has 
further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda 
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the 
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in 
court proceedings pertaining to this matter. 
2. That Plaintiff is in arrears in his child support, 
including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00. 
3. That nothing has changed since the Court previously 
(i.e., September 1988) found that Defendant had the present 
capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it 
is more grievous than it was before. 
4. That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and 
a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since 
those dates. 
5. That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the 
Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making 
child support payments but also during a time period when the 
sentence was stayed for the purpose of giving Plaintiff an 
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the 
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no 
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that 
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior 
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in 
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he 
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare. 
6. That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay 
child support. 
7. That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-
educated. His prior work experience includes being a licensed 
real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local 
attorneys. 
8. That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has 
a residence which he rents. The residence is furnished with 
furniture and other furnishings. He has power and heat in his 
residence. The Court has observed his manner of dress and he 
dresses reasonably well. 
9. That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his 
daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least 
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter 
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not 
paid child support. 
10. That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of 
time that he has not paid child support. 
11. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that 
Plaintifffs failure to pay child support has been willful. 
12. Because the failure to pay child support has been 
willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect 
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support. 
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs attitudes and 
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation 
from the moral norms of society. A parent influences a child for 
good or bad; some of that influence comes from the child's 
observations of the parent's behavior. For these reasons, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect 
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child 
and that until Plaintiff adopts an attitude, manifest by 
appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends 
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the 
Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter. In 
that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff 
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and 
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the 
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes 
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive 
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his 
daughter. 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court finds: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as 
stated in the aforesaid Findings of Fact, is willful and 
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohrr 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1985). Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child 
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff 
shows to this Court that he is concerned about the child's 
financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing 
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly 
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child 
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every 
month for a period of four (4) consecutive months. The Court 
believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support 
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of 
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude 
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny 
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child. If 
Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making 
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without 
further hearing, suspend visitation. 
DATED this Jj_ day of J/V f^ - 19^^. 
BY THE COURT: 
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. 
vs. 
NANCY P. 
COLEY, ; 
Plaintiff, 
COLEY, 
Defendant. 
i Case No. D 81 5126 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
FINDINGS OP PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
(Re: Amended order on Order to Show Cause) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was 
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. 
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record, 
Randall J. Holmgren. 
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John 
R. Bucher. 
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion, 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in 
Third vA,;._,>»
 w.w.. 
DEC 1 j 1990 
B£ ^ ^ ^ M A 
Ovyuij < ;^u. * 
Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the 
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its 
Order on or about July 13, 1990, On appeal, the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects 
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the 
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to 
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings 
of fact supportive of the Order denying child-visitation. 
Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court 
does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That these findings are based upon the evidence presented 
at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990. The Court has 
further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda 
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the 
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in 
court proceedings pertaining to this matter. 
2. That Plaintiff is in arrears in his child support, 
including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00. 
3. That nothing has changed since the Court previously 
(i.e., September 1988) found that Defendant had the present 
capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it 
is more grievous than it was before. 
4. That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and 
a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since 
those dates. 
5. That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the 
Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making 
child support payments but also during a time period when the 
sentence was stayed for the purpose of giving Plaintiff an 
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the 
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no 
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that 
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior 
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in 
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he 
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare. 
6. That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay 
child support. 
7. That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-
educated. His prior work experience includes being a licensed 
real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local 
attorneys. 
8. That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has 
a residence which he rents. The residence is furnished with 
furniture and other furnishings. He has power and heat in his 
residence. The Court has observed his manner of dress and he 
dresses reasonably well, 
9. That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his 
daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least 
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter 
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not 
paid child support. 
10. That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of 
time that he has not paid child support. 
11. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff's failure to pay child support has been willful. 
12. Because the failure to pay child support has been 
willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect 
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support. 
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff's attitudes and 
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation 
from the moral norms of society. A parent influences a child for 
good or bad; some of that influence comes from the child's 
observations of the parent's behavior. For these reasons, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect 
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child 
and that until Plaintiff adopts an attitude, manifest by 
appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends 
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the 
Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter. In 
that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff 
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and 
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the 
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes 
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive 
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his 
daughter. 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court finds: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as 
stated in the aforesaid Findings of Fact, is willful and 
contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1985). Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child 
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff 
shows to this Court that he is concerned about the child's 
financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing 
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly 
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child 
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every 
month for a period of four (4) consecutive months. The Court 
believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support 
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of 
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude 
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny 
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child. If 
Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making 
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without 
further hearing, suspend visitation. 
DATED this // day of 
BY THE COURT: 
EXHIBIT 
Coley v. Coley 
Mr. Coley's Payments ($50/Week) Since 7/16/90 Order 
DUE DATE 
JUL 23 
JUL 30 
AUG 6 
AUG 13 
AUG 20 
AUG 27 
SEP 3 
SEP 10 
SEP 17 
SEP 24 
OCT 1 
OCT 8 
OCT 15 
OCT 22 
OCT 29 
NOV 5 
NOV 12 
NOV 19 
NOV 26 
DEC 3 
DEC 10 
DEC 17 
DEC 24 
DEC 31 
JAN 07 
JAN 14 
JAN 21 
JAN 28 
FEB 04 
FEB 11 
FEB 18 
FEB 25 
AMOUNT DUE 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
AMOUNT PAID 
.00 
-40.00 
.00 
-100.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
-100.00 
-50.00 
.00 
.00 
-150.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
-100.00 
.00 
-460.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
-150.00 
.00 
-100.00 
.00 
.00 
-150.00 
.00 
.00 
DATE PAID 
JUL 26 
AUG 13 
SEP 10 
SEP 17 
OCT 11 
NOV 26 
DEC 10 
JAN 03 
JAN 22 
BALANCE DUE 
50.00 
60.00 
110.00 
60.00 
110.00 
160.00 
210.00 
160.00 
160.00 
210.00 
260.00 
160.00 
210.00 
260.00 
310.00 
360.00 
410.00 
460.00 
410.00 
460.00 
50.00 
100.00 
150.00 
200.00 
100.00 
150.00 
100.00 
150.00 
200.00 
100.00 
150.00 
200.00 
MAR 04 50.00 .00 250.00 
MAR 11 50.00 .00 300.00 
MAR 18 50.00 .00 350.00 
MAR 25 50.00 .00 400.00 
APR 01 50.00 .00 450.00 
APR 08 50.00 -450.00 APR 12 50.00 
APR 15 50.00 .00 100.00 
APR 22 50.00 .00 150.00 
APR 29 50.00 .00 200.00 
MAY 06 50.00 .00 250.00 
MAY 13 50.00 .00 300.00 
MAY 20 50.00 .00 350.00 
MAY 27 
